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A SIGNALING THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
COMPLIANCE
David H. Moore*
INTRODUCTION
For years international law scholarship generally assumed that nations
tend to comply with international law.' As Louis Henkin famously phrased
it, "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and
almost all of their obligations almost all of the time."2 Of course, the truth
is that noncompliance is common. Sadly, the assumption of compliance
may be farthest from the truth in the realm of international human rights.
Despite the dramatic increase in the number of human rights instruments
since World War II, noncompliance remains prevalent.' Recognizing, per-
haps, the degree of noncompliance that exists in international law generally,
scholars in recent years have begun to focus on what motivates nations to
comply with or deviate from international law.4
Many theories have been advanced to explain compliance. Abram and
Antonia Handler Chayes have argued that treaty compliance results largely
from a "propensity to comply," which in turn derives from efficiencies
achieved by avoiding case-by-case decisionmaking, the fact that treaties are
negotiated to reflect the parties' interests, and the norm that treaties create
law which states presumptively should obey.5 According to the Chayeses,
treaty compliance also derives from the need to maintain one's status within
a highly interrelated community of states.6 Addressing compliance with
John M. Olin Fellow in Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Douglas Baird,
Douglass Cassel, Cole Durham, Richard Epstein, Daniel Farber, Eric Posner, David Weissbrodt, and
especially Jack Goldsmith for their helpful suggestions regarding this Essay.
I See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823, 1826 (2002); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Treaties Make a Difference? Human Rights Treaties and
the Problem of Compliance, Ill YALE L.J. 1935, 1937 (2002). International relations scholarship, for
its part, largely ignored international law. Id. at 1942-43; Guzman, supra, at 1826-27.
2 LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979).
3 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1940, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1999, 2021.
4 See id. at 1937 & n.2, 1939, 1942-43; Guzman, supra note 1, at 1826-27.
5 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 3-9 (1995).
6 Id. at 27-28.
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customary international law from a rational choice perspective, Jack Gold-
smith and Eric Posner have rejected the notion that nations feel a sense of
obligation to obey international law and have treated compliance as an
epiphenomenal result of the convergence of a nation's interests with the
tenets of that law.' Defending the influence of international law, Harold
Koh has argued that nations comply with international law as a result of re-
peated participation in transnational legal interactions with state and non-
state actors which leads to internalization of international norms and the
formation of national identity around those norms.' Likewise recognizing
the importance of non-state actors, liberal theorists like Ann-Marie Slaugh-
ter have focused on the impact that individuals and groups exert on state
behaviors through domestic political institutions.9 Still other approaches
exist. 10
None of these approaches, however, offers a comprehensive descrip-
tion of compliance with international law in general or human rights law
in particular. To name some of the more apparent shortcomings, the
Chayes's managerial model assumes a tendency to comply rather than ex-
plaining compliance." Rational choice theory has not provided a com-
prehensive explanation of why a nation would find it in its self-interest to
conform to human rights norms when it is not compelled to do so by do-
mestic influences and is not coerced 2 into doing so by other states. 3
7 Goldsmith and Posner claim that the very thing we term customary international law is actually
patterns of behavior resulting from the pursuit of self-interest under four behavioral logics: coincidence
of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordination. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Pos-
ner I]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Tra-
ditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 640-41, 654-59 (2000) [hereinafter
Goldsmith & Posner II].
8 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181, 203-05 (1996) ("[A]s
nations participate in transnational legal process, through a complex combination of rational self-
interest, transnational interaction, norm-internalization, and identity-formation, international law be-
comes a factor driving their international relations.").
9 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and
the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 397-400 (1994).
10 For a more extensive review of international law and international relations theories on compli-
ance, see Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1944-62; Guzman, supra note 1, at 1830-40.
11 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1832.
12 Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 668 (stating that coercion accounts for some confor-
mance with human rights, but not much, as "nations are not generally inclined to expend military and
economic resources to prevent another nation from abusing its citizens"). But cf. Stephen D. Krasner,
Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139,
140-41, 143-44, 166 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993) (arguing that "[t]he question of whether states adhere
to [human rights] regimes is not a function of the extent to which a regime enhances information and
discourages cheating by other actors; rather it is a function of the extent to which more powerful states
in the system are willing to enforce the principles and norms of the regime").
13 See Koh, supra note 8, at 201 (noting that "rationalistic, state-centered theories work far less
well .. in such areas as human rights").
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Transnational legal process theory fails to explain how human rights prin-
ciples become internalized domestically. 4 Finally, liberal theory has been
called into question by recent empirical work, finding among other things
that "ratification of treaties on the whole, and of regional treaties in par-
ticular, often appears to be associated with worse human rights practices
than would otherwise be expected" and that "fully democratic nations
have worse torture ratings when they ratify the Torture Convention than
would otherwise be expected."' 5
Clearly, no one theory has a comer on the explanation for compli-
ance. In fact, all share a common failing. Each fails to take adequate note
of a significant dynamic that affects human rights compliance: signal-
ing.' 6 This Essay corrects that failing by developing a signaling theory of
human rights compliance. Like the theories developed to date, signaling
theory does not explain human rights compliance in its entirety. Indeed, it
does not purport to do so. Instead, signaling theory supplements the ra-
tional choice perspective on compliance, 7 helping to explain that puzzling
14 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1835-36. The theory suggests that a nation might internalize inter-
national norms in order to avoid the disruption that violation of norms causes in its ability to participate
in the transnational legal process. See Koh, supra note 8, at 206-07. In essence, this is an argument that
the gains from cooperation inspire nations to comply with international law. Transnational legal proc-
ess, in this regard, adds little to the rational choice perspective, besides reliance on the unexplained
process of internalization. For another attempt to explain internalization of norms, see Martha Fin-
nemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 51 INT'L ORG. 887,
902-05 (1998).
15 Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2001-02 & n.215; see also id. at 1988 ("[L]iberal theory is unable to
explain why full democracies with the best [human rights] ratings have lower ratification rates [for hu-
man rights treaties] than those with slightly worse ratings."). Other empirical findings were consistent
with liberal theory. See id. at 1987-88, 2001, 2019.
16 The idea of human rights protection as a form of signaling has largely been neglected by legal
scholars. The most comprehensive development of the idea to date has been undertaken by Daniel Far-
ber, who argues that protection of human rights through constitutionalism and an independent judiciary
is a signal to investors of a state's commitment to and capacity for economic liberalization. Daniel A.
Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84-93 (2002); see also Hathaway, supra note 1, at
2012-13. This Essay attempts to develop a broader theoretical understanding of the signaling dynamic
in the human rights arena.
17 More specifically, signaling theory might be considered a refinement of reputational theories
of international law compliance. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms,
and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 674-75 (2001) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW
AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000)); POSNER, supra, at 46 (signaling is a behavioral logic supporting a repu-
tational theory). Reputational theories generally assert that rational nations may adhere to their
commitments in order to establish reputations for compliance, which increase opportunities for coop-
eration. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 1, at 1845-50. Signaling theory explains that affirmative
costly acts that can distinguish more cooperative nations from less cooperative ones may be used to
strengthen a reputation for cooperativeness. Signaling theory thus helps to explain why nations
might engage in affirmative acts consistent with human rights principles rather than simply avoid
visible noncompliance. Likewise, signaling theory provides a more plausible explanation for com-
pliance in situations where compliance would not directly affect another nation, as is generally the
case with human rights. Finally, signaling theory helps to explain why noncostly compliance (e.g.,
compliance compelled by domestic audiences) may not improve a country's reputation for coopera-
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swath of compliance that occurs when a nation neither faces effective do-
mestic pressure nor direct pressure from other states to comply.1 8 Signal-
ing theory thus makes a significant contribution to compliance theory
while yielding important insights for the protection of rights around the
world.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the basics of signaling
theory in the human rights context, explaining why and how human rights
compliance acts as a signal. Part II deals with influences that can alter the
basic dynamics of signaling. Part III examines the conditions under which
signaling is likely to have its most significant impact on human rights com-
pliance. Part IV identifies insights that signaling theory sheds on interna-
tional human rights law and compliance, while Part V continues to explore
those insights, focusing on the lessons signaling theory provides for im-
proving human rights protection. Throughout, this Essay offers brief anec-
dotes illustrating concepts discussed. Sophisticated empirical research
would be required to rigorously test the assertions made. 9 This Essay
leaves that project for another day in order to focus on the theoretical un-
derstanding of compliance as signaling.
I. THE BASICS OF SIGNALING THEORY
A signal is a costly behavior that can communicate information about
the sender when the receiver knows that only senders with a particular char-
acteristic can afford, or are willing, to send the signal.2" Signals function in
tiveness. Cf Guzman, supra note 1, at 1846-48 (acknowledging that compliance may be motivated
by reputational concerns or some independent interest, but failing to address whether compliance due
to an independent interest bears on reputation).
18 Nor does signaling theory attempt to explain mere inaction that might be termed compliance.
A nation might refrain from committing human rights abuses because it lacks any incentive to do
otherwise. For example, according to Goldsmith and Posner, nations may refrain from committing
crimes against humanity because "[it] is unattractive and costly to kill people, it disrupts society and
the economy, and often there are simply no real animosities among citizens, and thus nothing to be
gained from crimes against humanity." Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 668. Similarly, a
nation may refrain from arbitrarily arresting all its citizens because it lacks incentive to do so, even if
it arrests some. Some inaction consistent with human rights principles thus occurs regardless of
other actors or pressures. See id. at 655-57, 672. This type of inaction is not explained by the sig-
naling model.
19 Indeed, the difficulty of rigorously testing signaling theory is a significant limitation. See
McAdams, supra note 17, at 640-42, 688.
20 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 19, 22; James D. Morrow, The Strategic Setting of Choices: Sig-
naling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics, in STRATEGIC CHOICE AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 88 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 1999); A. MICHAEL SPENCE,
MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATIONAL TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES 107
(1974) (explaining that signals communicate information otherwise unavailable to the receiver when an
alterable attribute of the signaler is unobservable but influences "the way the receiver would prefer to
reward or respond to the signaler," and "the costs of signaling [are] ... negatively correlated with the
unobservable attribute which the receiver values"). James Morrow refers to this brand of signaling as
costly signaling, while arguing that different types can sometimes be distinguished through costless sig-
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environments in which the receiver cannot directly observe the information
relayed by the signal. Signaling is effective when both senders and receiv-
ers understand that a particular action is a signal.
To illustrate with a familiar example, consider education as a signal
of employee productivity.2' Employers cannot directly observe how
productive job applicants will be if hired. However, obtaining an
education costs money, time, and effort. Arguably, these costs are
negatively correlated with productivity-that is, persons with higher
productivity find obtaining an education to be less costly. As a result, an
employer who seeks highly productive employees can estimate
productivity based on the educational attainment of the applicant. Highly
productive applicants thus have an incentive to obtain an education and to
excel in doing so to signal their type.
Just as educational attainment may serve as a signal for employers,
compliance with international human rights principles may serve as a signal
to other nations. Compliance, as used in this Essay, refers to behavior con-
sistent with international human rights principles. The behavior need not
arise out of a sense of legal obligation nor be based on an international in-
strument that purports to impose such an obligation.22 Instead, compliance
may be motivated by the dynamics of signaling, and signaling, as discussed
below, may be aided by, but does not require, the creation of international
instruments.23
Conformity with human rights principles can serve as a signal, in part,
because it is costly.24 Respecting human rights may, for example, require
nals, such as international resolutions, that help coordinate action. Morrow, supra, at 88-90. Others
refer to costless communication that facilitates coordination as cheap talk. See Jack L. Goldsmith &
Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice Perspective,
31 J. LEGAL STUDS. 115, 125-29 (2002) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner Ill]. Because I deal with the
costly behavior of compliance, I need not decide which label is more appropriate for costless communi-
cation. Moreover, this Essay need not address the extent to which costless acts may also influence other
nations.
21 The example of education as a signal of productivity in the market for jobs is drawn from sig-
naling pioneer and Nobel laureate A. Michael Spence. See SPENCE, supra note 20, at 14-30. But cf.
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms: Complementary Accounts
of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 426 (2002) (noting, alternatively,
that education may be a cause, not a signal, of higher productivity).
22 Compare Goldsmith & Posner I, supra note 7, at 1115 (theorizing that "[s]tates do not comply
with [customary intemational law] because of a sense of moral or legal obligation"), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987) ("Customary inter-
national law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation.").
23 See infra text accompanying notes 108-11.
24 See Farber, supra note 16, at 84, 89, 92-93, 98; STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES 15-16, 20-24 (1999); Richard A. Posner, Creat-
ing a Legal Framework for Economic Development, WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER, Feb. 1998, at 1, 9;
cf. Goldsmith & Posner Ill, supra note 20, at 122-23.
The costly nature of signals distinguishes the signaling theory developed in this Essay from
97:879 (2003)
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the creation of an independent judiciary, with its attendant monetary cost
and risk of decisions unfavorable to the political arm of government.25 In
the United States, respecting the rights of criminal defendants has meant
excluding evidence obtained through unconstitutional searches. Similarly,
respecting property rights has entailed compensating those whose property
is taken through the power of eminent domain. In any nation, safeguarding
rights imposes costs.
Of course, failing to safeguard rights may also be costly. A study
evaluating 155 nations with market economies between 1960 and 1980
found that economic "[g]rowth rates in societies that circumscribe or pro-
scribe political, civil, and economic liberty are only 40 to 56 percent (de-
pending upon the attribute) of those in societies in which individual rights
are protected. '26 "[T]he average growth rate in societies where these free-
doms are restricted is one-third of that of free societies," amounting to "a
67 percent tax on the wealth of the citizens of such states. '2 7 These costs,
however, differ from the costs inherent in signaling. Signaling imposes
the opportunity or component costs of engaging in the signaling behavior
itself. An actor's ability and willingness to incur the costs of signaling
behavior can communicate something about the actor. In contrast, the
economic stagnation uncovered by the study is not endogenous to the act
of violating rights, but rather is the consequence or correlate of that
behavior, and thus tells us something about the behavior rather than
something about the actor.
More concretely, incurring the costs of human rights compliance dem-
onstrates that a nation is able and willing to restrain the reach and exercise
of its power in the near term. By contrast, the drag on economic growth
that follows violation of human rights merely reveals that such a violation
causes or correlates with economic stagnation. Of course, the distinction
fades to the extent an actor knows ex ante the consequences or correlate of
Robert Jervis's theory of signals and indices. In Jervis's theory, signals are words or actions that are
intended to influence perceptions and that can be sent by deceptive nations as easily as by honest
ones. ROBERT JERVIS, THE LOGIC OF IMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18, 21, 66 (1970). Na-
tions should therefore discount Jervis's brand of signals. See id. at 23, 67. Indices, in Jervis's the-
ory, are words or actions that are believed to be beyond an actor's ability to manipulate for the
purpose of projecting an image. Id. at 18, 28. By contrast, in the theory developed here, nations
know that signals may be used to influence perceptions, but they trust them to the extent that the cost
structure of the signals distinguishes among nations (i.e., produces a separating equilibrium). The
signaling theory in this Essay thus describes behavior that conceptually lies somewhere between
Jervis's signals and indices.
25 See Farber, supra note 16, at 93; see also Posner, supra note 24, at 7 ("[P]olitical authorities will
be reluctant to create a corps of truly independent officials who may constitute a rival center of
power .... ").
26 GERALD W. SCULLY, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 176 (1992);
see also Posner, supra note 24, at 3 (citing "empirical evidence ., that the rule of law does contribute to
a nation's wealth and its rate of economic growth").
27 SCULLY, supra note 26, at 179.
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an action. In that case, the difference between the costs of signaling behav-
ior and the costs of the behavior's consequences is a difference in timing.
The costs of engaging in signaling behavior are immediate.2 8 The costs re-
sulting from correlative or consequential phenomena typically are delayed.
Even when the difference is a difference in timing, however, the willingness
to engage in the signaling behavior can communicate something about the
actor.
Returning to the example of human rights, respecting human rights
tends to impose immediate costs-restraints on government power or the
costs of providing opportunities. Violating human rights provides, from the
government's perspective, the immediate benefits of unrestrained action,
while risking future costs, such as stunted economic growth. Complying
with human rights thus demonstrates a willingness to restrain present use of
power for long-term benefits, while violating human rights preserves the
full range of government power in the present at the expense of future
gains.
As a result of inherent costs or differences in timing, complying with
human rights can signal a nation's willingness to restrain the exercise of
power in the near term.2 9 The concept of restraint is expressed in terms of
discount rate in this Essay.30 A nation with a low discount rate is one that is
willing to restrain itself in the near term, as demonstrated by its compliance
with human rights. A nation with a high discount rate rejects restraints on
its exercise of power, disregarding human rights.31
28 See Farber, supra note 16, at 86.
29 See id. at 98; cf. Guzman, supra note 1, at 1884 (arguing "that violations of international law im-
pose a reputational cost because they have a negative impact on other countries' perception of a state's
willingness to accept short-term costs in order to protect long-term relationships and trust").
30 A nation's discount rate describes the present value the nation places on a future benefit. A na-
tion with a low discount rate, say 20 percent, discounts a future benefit of 10 by 20 percent and places a
present value of 8 on the future benefit. A nation with a high discount rate of say 70 percent sees the
same future benefit of 10 as being worth 3 at present. Accordingly, if these nations must decide whether
to defect for a present gain of 5 or cooperate for a future benefit of 10, the low-discount state will coop-
erate to obtain 8 while the high-discount state will defect to obtain 5.
For a critique of the signaling model's reliance on discount rate, see Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or
Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 374-75
(2002). For a defense of the same, see Eric A. Posner, The Signaling Models of Social Norms: Further
Thoughts, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 465,476 (2002).
What lies behind a nation's discount rate or level of restraint is a complex question that requires ad-
ditional study. At a minimum, political and economic stability, judicial independence, or non-arbitrary
decisionmaking may be component parts.
31 In this Essay, I employ the simplifying assumption of a unitary discount rate for each country.
Cf. Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 476 (defending use of a single discount rate as "a useful
simplification for expository purposes"); Harold L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, Models of Sovereign
Debt: Partial Versus General Reputations, 39 INT'L ECON. REV. 55 (1998) (employing a general
reputation model to support the existence of sovereign debt). However, a more nuanced explanation
might posit that nations have multiple discount rates, each in a different plane of interaction. See W.
Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of
97:879 (2003)
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Nations interested in long-term cooperation have an incentive to iden-
tify low-discount states. These nations are more likely to exercise restraint
and forego immediate gains from defection for the long-term benefits of
cooperation.32 All things being equal, then, nations looking to obtain the
benefits of long-term cooperation, whether economic or otherwise, will pre-
fer to engage nations with low discount rates.33 Low-discount states thus
have an incentive to send human rights signals to attract cooperative oppor-
tunities .3
4
To illustrate with a simplified example, suppose a South American na-
tion has agricultural products that it could export. If the nation is known to
arbitrarily arrest citizens who speak out against the regime, the nation will
be perceived as having a relatively high discount rate. Because of this rate,
a Western European nation wishing to secure a long-term source of the
products would be less likely to enlist the South American nation than a na-
tion that has a lower discount rate, all other concerns being equal.35 If, on
the other hand, the South American nation does not engage in arbitrary de-
tention and allows citizens who are so detained to recover against the gov-
ernment,36 it incurs immediate costs in the process and signals that it has a
lower discount rate. The Western European country would be more likely
to cooperate with the signaling South American nation. The South Ameri-
can nation thus has incentive to signal.
Whether the South American nation, or any nation, will actually send
Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 38-39 (2002); Russell Hardin, Law and Social Norms in the Large, 86
VA. L. REV. 1821, 1821-28 (2000); George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance
and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 97, 100-09 (2002). In such a theory, the information
communicated by a nation's human rights record would nonetheless be relevant over a variety of
planes to the extent a nation's human rights practices are not influenced by direct domestic or foreign
benefits or sanctions and thus indicate how a nation will act in the absence of such direct incentives.
But cf Downs & Jones, supra, at 107 n.33, 112.
32 Such nations are also better candidates for more sophisticated agreements. Cf Guzman, supra
note 1, at 1855.
13 Cf id. at 1850 (States that do not develop a reputation for compliance "choose short-term benefits
over long-term gains ... are more likely to ignore international commitments and, as a result, are less
likely to find partners willing to rely on such commitments.")
34 See JERVIS, supra note 24, at 7 (recognizing that obtaining an image as a cooperator can facilitate
cooperation with other nations); Guzman, supra note 1, at 1849 (recognizing that "[a] country that de-
velops a reputation for compliance with international obligations signals to other countries that it is co-
operative" and is thereby able "to enjoy long-term relationships with other cooperative states");
Goldsmith & Posner III, supra note 20, at 122 (explaining that a low-discount (i.e., politically stable)
nation "wants other nations to know that it has a low discount rate, for that would make it an attractive
partner in ... cooperative relationships," and will therefore try to distinguish itself by sending "signals
that [high-discount] nations are unable to afford").
35 There may be situations where nations seek short-term exploitation rather than long-term coop-
eration and therefore care less about the discount rate of the nation to be exploited.
36 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171 (prohibiting arbitrary detention or arrest and mandating "an enforceable right to
compensation" for violations).
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human rights signals depends on the costs of signaling and the gains signal-
ing will secure.37 The outcome of this cost-benefit analysis also depends on
the nation's discount rate. Nations with low discount rates are able to send
the signal more cheaply in the present period than are nations with high dis-
count rates. As a result, nations with low discount rates generally have
greater incentive to signal.
The basic incentives behind the decision to signal can be captured in a
theoretic game of imperfect information, as modeled in Figure 1.38 The
game also captures the incentives of the state deciding whether to cooperate
with a nation that has or has not signaled. The game begins at the circle in
the center, where a hypothetical force labeled "Nature" determines whether
Player 1, the state deciding whether to signal, has a high or low discount
rate.39 If Player I has a high discount rate, the game proceeds along the top
axis; if Player 1 is a low-discount state, the game occurs along the bottom
axis. Player 2, the potential partner state, does not know whether Player 1
is high or low discount. As a result, the partner state does not know
whether the game is being played along the top or bottom axis.
The partner state begins with an estimate of the probability that the
signaling state has a low discount rate. This estimate may be based on the
partner state's past interactions with the signaling state, the signaling state's
governmental structure, the political party in control of the signaling state,
the signaling state's regional affiliation, or a host of other factors that might
indicate whether a state is likely to cooperate. In this model, the probability
that the signaling state is low discount is assumed to be 0.5.
Once nature has determined whether the signaling state has a high or
low discount rate, the signaling state decides whether to protect human
rights, in which case the game proceeds to the left, or to violate those rights,
in which case the game moves to the right. The decision whether to comply
with international human rights is based on a cost-benefit analysis. For
states with low discount rates, the cost of complying with human rights is 1.
Compliance costs states with high discount rates 2.40 The benefit to a state
from violating human rights is 1-for example, the state might, through ar-
bitrary detention, uncover criminal activity that it would not otherwise de-
tect.
37 Cf. Guzman, supra note 1, at 1853.
38 For other explanations of games of imperfect information, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW 122-58 (1994); In-Koo Cho & David M. Krepps, Signaling Games and Stable
Equilibria, 102 Q.J. ECON. 179, 183-86 (1987).
39 Nature, a hypothetical, independent force used to designate type in signaling games, could repre-
sent the underlying characteristics left unexplored by this Essay that determine a nation's discount rate.
40 A signal works when it can be sent by one type more cheaply than by another. See BAIRD ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 124; ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 174 (1992). Low-
discount states are able to send the compliance signal more cheaply given their restraint or preference
for future benefits.
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FIGURE 1
(0,-5) (3, -5)
Cooperate HIGH-DISCOUNT STATE CooperateCooprate-5
Avoid >! Comply (Signal) Do Not Comply K Avoid
(-2,0) (1,0)
Nature
(4,5) (6,5)
Cooperate Cooperate
C Comply (Signal) Do Not Comply 7
void LOW-DISCOUNT Avoid
(-1, o) (1, o)
After the signaling state has complied with or deviated from human
rights principles, the partner state decides whether to cooperate with the
signaling state. The partner state's options are reflected in the angled ar-
rows on either side of the game. The benefit from cooperating with a state
with a low discount rate is 5. This payoff takes into account not only the
benefits of the immediate interaction, but the discounted benefits of the
long-term cooperation that results with such a state. The payoff from coop-
erating with a state with a high discount rate is -5 for the partner state. The
high-discount state takes advantage of the partner state in a one-time deal or
at some point in an abbreviated sequence of interaction. The partner state
thereby loses the investment made in cooperating with the state and poten-
tially the opportunity to cooperate with another state. The high-discount
state gains 2 from the interaction.
Given these payoffs, the dominant strategy for high-discount states in
this model is to refrain from complying, thereby distinguishing high- and
low-discount states. The partner state cooperates with states that signal, be-
lieving that low-discount states signal, while high-discount states do not.
The model in Figure 1 thus illustrates the cost-benefit analyses that moti-
vate the decisions to signal and to cooperate.
II. ADDITIONAL INFLUENCES THAT AFFECT SIGNALING
In practice, the cost-benefit analyses involved in signaling and cooper-
ating are more complex, taking account of a wider range of inputs than are
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reflected in the model. 4' These additional inputs alter the payoffs from sig-
naling and cooperating. For purposes of illustration, I discuss a few of
these inputs. An understanding of these inputs illuminates the relative role
signaling plays in the decision whether to cooperate and the influences that
might increase the incentive to signal.
A. Influences Affecting the Decision To Cooperate
The decision whether to cooperate with a high-discount state may be
profoundly affected by any unusual benefits the state has to offer.42 As
noted in the example of the South American nation, a partner state would
prefer to interact with a low-discount state, all things being equal. But all
things are not always equal. Sometimes a nation's interests may be served
by interacting with a high-discount nation that offers a highly significant
benefit or that is such a significant presence that it realistically cannot be
ignored.43 If the high-discount state is the lowest priced source of a critical
raw material, for example, the payoff from cooperating with the state may
be compelling despite the risk of defection. In such a case, the benefit of
cooperating with the high-discount state in the model might be positive
rather than negative. As a result, the partner state would have an incentive
to cooperate with the nonsignaling, high-discount state.
The partner state might first try to pressure the high-discount state into
signaling to obtain an assurance of cooperation. But ultimately, the partner
state might cooperate irrespective of whether the high-discount state sig-
nals. Indeed, the high-discount state might test its own strength by trying to
persuade the partner state to engage before any signaling occurs. If the
high-discount state is successful, it obtains the benefits of cooperation with-
out the costs of signaling.
The incentive of an unusual payoff accounts for much behavior in the
international arena. It underlies, for example, the European Union's history
of differential treatment of China and Myanmar. While the E.U. has im-
posed a variety of sanctions on Myanmar for its human rights abuses, the
E.U. has simultaneously pursued increased trade with China in spite of its
abuses. 44 The economic gains offered have provided strong incentives to
engage China despite the fact that China has not participated in pervasive or
consistent signaling.
41 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1851-54 & n. 116 (acknowledging the contextual nature of the com-
pliance decision).
42 See Andrew Kydd, Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation, 54 INT'L ORG. 325, 332-33 (2000)
(expressing this concept mathematically).
43 It is possible that once a low-discount state has engaged a nonsignaling state it will find that it is
able to maintain cooperation. In such cases, cooperation might continue without signaling. At a mini-
mum, however, the low-discount state will have incentive to extract signals from the high-discount state
in order to maintain its low-discount reputation.
44 See Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, Human Rights in the European Union: Internal Versus External
Objectives, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 363, 386-95 (2001).
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The draw of unusual incentives likewise explains much of the United
States' behavior in the current war on terrorism. 45  After September 11,
2001, that war became a consuming priority for the United States. The lure
of significant military and political gains has led the U.S. to further engage
countries that do not participate in widespread signaling. 46 For example, the
U.S. allied itself with Uzbekistan in order to use an Uzbek airbase and air-
space in the fight against the Taliban even though Uzbekistan is known for
its human rights abuses against Muslims. 47  Similarly, the U.S. postponed
the release of its annual report on religious freedom reportedly because
some of the countries criticized in the report were seen as important to the
war on terrorism. 48  Understanding that the decision to engage nonsignaling
states occurs within a larger framework of self-interest renders this behavior
unsurprising.
It is likewise unsurprising that a nation might wield such extraordinary
power that it need not signal in order to attract cooperation.49 The United
States, for example, need not and does not comply with various signals that
are sent in the international human rights arena. Its extensive activity on
the world stage provides significant information from which nations can es-
timate its level of cooperativeness.50  In addition, its sheer strength attracts
45 For a Cold War example of this phenomenon, see Scott Horton & Randy Sellier, The Utility of
Presidential Certifications of Compliance with United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Sal-
vador, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 825, 834-36, 840-41, 859 (describing the executive branch's willingness to
continue aid to El Salvador in spite of terrible human rights violations given the importance of having a
pro-American government at that country's helm).
46 See Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Report Criticizes Allies in Antiterror Campaign for Human Rights
Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at A14 (noting that many of the U.S.'s "strategic allies in the war on
terror abused human rights in their own countries last year" and suggesting that while the State Depart-
ment's human rights report criticized such abuses, it appeared to step lightly where U.S. interests in the
war on terror were at stake).
47 C.J. Chivers, Alliance with U.S. Spotlights Uzbek Rights Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at
BI, B4.
48 Andrea Koppel & Elsie Labott, U.S. Holds Report Critical of Key Nations, Oct. 1, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/l0/01/gen.religion.report/index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2003).
41 Cf POSNER, supra note 17, at 28 ("The tycoon can violate... norms simply because other people
value dealing with him so much that they will not cut off relations with him even if they do not trust
him.").
50 This observation raises the question why nations do not, at some point, obtain sufficient informa-
tion about each other's type and stop signaling. Cf. McAdams, supra note 17, at 664-66. Signaling
may become less important to the advent of cooperation among states that have developed a long history
of cooperation. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 21, at 429, 433. Nonetheless, signaling continues to
play a role. Signaling assures a long-time partner that a nation remains cooperative, Given the many
factors that can alter a nation's type, such as elections or economic reversals, as well as the difficulty of
obtaining information about other nations, this reassurance is important, particularly if a relaxed atmos-
phere of trust between two nations has increased the potential gains from one-time defection. See
POSNER, supra note 17, at 21; Cole & Kehoe, supra note 31, at 57, 67-69 (observing that in their model
of general reputation, as long as there is minimal uncertainty about a government's type, reputation
plays a key role in sustaining cooperation). A state may also continue to signal, even if signaling is un-
necessary to sustain cooperation with a certain state, in order to maintain a broader reputation as a low-
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or compels cooperation regardless of the signals it sends. These dynamics
contribute to the double standard that the United States maintains and the
resulting frustration many nations feel toward the United States.51
B. Influences Affecting the Decision to Signal
Just as the payoffs of cooperation may lead a nation to cooperate in the
absence of signaling, changes in the payoffs from signaling influence
whether a nation will participate in signaling behaviors. The payoffs from
signaling may be altered by a change in the cost of sending a signal. If sig-
naling costs increase, the signal will likely be sent less frequently.52 For
example, if one must intervene in another state that has violated human
rights to manifest a low discount rate, fewer nations are likely to engage in
the signal.53 Those that do intervene manifest a lower discount rate than
those that merely comply with human rights at home.
By contrast, if the cost of a signal decreases, states with higher dis-
count rates might find it in their interest to engage in the signaling behav-
ior.5 4 For example, the favorable position on religious freedom taken by
Vatican II has rendered it less costly for countries in which Catholicism
predominates to provide greater religious freedom.5 5 The resulting respect
for religious freedom, however, does not necessarily reflect a lower dis-
count rate as much as a change in the cost of ensuring that freedom. Con-
sequently, states observing the increased freedom need not update their
discount rate estimates.
Another phenomenon that may inspire signaling behavior might be
termed signal entrepreneurship.5 6 Because the characteristic communicated
discount type and to nourish a signal that it can send with relative ease. See POSNER, supra note 17, at
21. Finally, a nation might continue to engage in signaling behaviors as part of an effort to obtain the
benefits of signal entrepreneurship. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
51 See Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 667, 669; Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human
Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in THE COST OF ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN
POLICY 345, 347-49 (Shepard Forman & Patrick Stewart eds., 2001) (citing geopolitical power as one
source of the United States' paradoxical approach toward international human rights); Johan D. van der
Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International Criminal Justice, and National Self-
Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776-90, 831 (2001) (detailing ways in which the United States has
limited the applicability of international human rights law to itself even as it uses human rights to judge
other nations).
52 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 20.
53 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2007 (noting that "military intervention and economic sanc-
tions ... are used relatively infrequently to enforce human rights norms, in no small part because there
is little incentive for individual states to take on the burden of engaging in such enforcement activity").
54 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 19-20.
55 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC
DOCUMENTS 209 (Tad Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 1998).
56 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 29-32 (discussing the dynamics of social norm entrepreneurship),
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 14, at 896-99 (discussing non-state international norm entrepreneurs).
Richard McAdams is puzzled by the contradiction that signal entrepreneurs arguably have incentive to
promote separating signals, but nonetheless speak as if their signals are universal. McAdams, supra
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by human rights compliance-restraint-is perceived as positive, states that
successfully campaign for behaviors that signal restraint reap a perception
of moral authority. 57 A state that controls the signals that designate low-
discount types also obtains a degree of influence over the actions of other
states. The nation authoring a signal likewise has the ability to select sig-
nals it can send more cheaply and that help it to identify countries that re-
semble itself. A nation that has established or is working to establish a
signal may thus have additional incentives not only to engage in the signal-
ing behavior but to promote the behavior through monitoring or other
means.
Similarly, states may have incentive to become signal entrepreneurs
through the creation of new signals in order to wrest the gains of signal en-
trepreneurship from other entrepreneurs. The incentives of signal entrepre-
neurship may account, in part, for the debate between developed and
developing countries over economic and social rights.58 Developed West-
ern5 9 countries have promoted a focus on civil and political rights. Argua-
bly, these countries are able to send these signals more cheaply and gain
moral authority from their acceptance. Perhaps in an effort to undercut this
authority, the developing countries have promoted economic and social
rights. Signaling theory illuminates, however, why these economic and so-
cial signals have been relatively unsuccessful. Signals identify low-
discount types for cooperative endeavors. The gains from cooperation pro-
vide the incentive to signal. Developing countries do not, generally speak-
ing, offer the same level of gains from cooperation that developed countries
do. As a result, the incentive to adhere to the signals advanced by the de-
veloping countries is correspondingly weak. The point to be made here,
though, is that the conflict over economic and social rights arguably in-
volves a battle for the benefits of signal entrepreneurship.
While some states battle for the benefits of authoring signals, other states
note 17, at 635-36. This contradiction is more perceived than real. An effective signal not only sepa-
rates the pool of potential partners, but identifies good types. The signal thus rests on a conception of
how potential partners should behave, a notion that applies to all potential partners. In practice, of
course, only those partners that are of the good type will engage in the separating signal.
57 This reward results, not from the introduction of some exogenous norm, but from the structure of
signaling. See McAdams, supra note 17, at 684. The reward might be analogized to that obtained by
the sponsors of a successful bill in Congress.
58 See Krasner, supra note 12, at 163-64; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 238 (2d ed. 2000); ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 428-29 (1992).
59 Economic and social rights were also favored by communist countries during the Cold War, see
Harold J. Berman, United States Policy with Respect to International Human Rights, 50 EMORY L.J.
769, 769 (2001) (noting that as between the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the latter "was the favorite of the So-
viet Union and its allies" in the 1970s), though these rights were initially promoted by the United States
after World War II, see Bruno Simma, Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AT AGE FIFTY: A
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 263, 276 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1995).
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receive payoffs from foregoing signals. These states find it in their interest to
ignore or flout signals advanced by nations they oppose.6 ° Leaders of these
states may benefit as, for example, their domestic constituencies coalesce be-
hind their willingness to flex their muscle against more powerful or ideologi-
cally opposed nations. Flouting of signals, with its attendant costs in
antagonism, risk of retaliation, and foregone cooperation, can also serve as a
signal of leadership and resolve from the flouting state to sympathetic nations.
Publication of a nation's human rights practices also can change the
signaling incentives for a state. As further discussed below, publicity ex-
pands the sweep and therefore the benefit of the compliance signal. 6' At the
same time, publicity uncovers attempts to mimic signals without fully par-
ticipating in signaling behaviors and puts pressure on mimicking states to
comply more completely if they wish to obtain the benefits of cooperation.
Similarly, publicity may increase the pressure on low-discount states that
engage nonsignaling states to enforce human rights in order to preserve
their reputations as low-discount states.
Finally, the fact that human rights compliance is not the only means by
which a country may communicate its discount rate influences whether a coun-
try will comply. Just as a job applicant might rely on extracurricular and volun-
teer activities, in addition to educational attainment, to signal productivity, a
nation may communicate its discount rate through a variety of behaviors. 62 In-
deed, within the realm of human rights alone, a nation might signal its type by
monitoring the compliance of others, submitting to supranational enforcement
mechanisms, or allowing NGOs, such as Amnesty International, access to its
territory. Outside the human rights realm, a nation might signal that it intends
to cooperate in the future by repaying old debts. 63 Or a nation might develop a
60 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 28-29. Posner acknowledges, in addressing social norms, that the
motivations of those who flout signals are not explained by signaling theory, but by Thomas Schelling's
commitment model. Id. at 29 & n.14 (citing THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT
(1960)). However, flouting the signals of one group is itself a costly action and can serve as a signal of
type to members of a rival group. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 25. Flouting a group's signals com-
municates that a player has a high discount rate vis-A-vis members of the flouted group, but a low rate as
to members of the rival group. The refusal to send certain signals can thus be cast in the language of
signaling theory. Nonetheless, as Posner recognizes, signaling theory does not offer a complete expla-
nation of the decision to align with one group over another.
61 See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
62 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 24-25 ("[S]ignaling theory suggests that... [a]ny costly action can
be a signal."); McAdams, supra note 17, at 631, 640, 687-88. The fact that there are other ways in which
nations can communicate their discount rate may help to explain why human rights compliance is not more
prominent. On the other hand, given the historical circumstances that gave rise to modem human rights,
one can surmise that human rights signaling is more prominent and global than many potential signaling
behaviors. Admittedly, however, the number of channels for conveying a country's discount rate dimin-
ishes the impact and complicates the testability of a signaling theory of human rights compliance.
63 See Harold L. Cole et al., Default, Settlement, and Signaling: Lending Resumption in a Reputa-
tional Model of Sovereign Debt, 36 INT'L ECON. REV. 365, 365-78 (1995) (developing a model of nine-
teenth-century sovereign debt repayment in which nations that have defaulted in the past settle old debts
to signal that they are now stable and intend to repay their future loans).
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history of actual cooperation.6 A nation that has provided sufficient assurance
of its type through other means may feel less need to comply with human
rights.65 On the other hand, a failure to comply may undermine the effective-
ness of the signals a nation does send. Furthermore, human rights compliance
is a particularly powerful signal for two reasons.66
First, like actions that directly affect other nations, such as debt repay-
ment, respecting human rights imposes costs on the complying nation.
However, nations are less likely to attach a sanction to the violation of hu-
man rights as they are to actions, like failure to repay, that directly affect
them.67 Consequently, a nation's compliance with human rights, in the ab-
sence of threatened sanctions, provides a unique insight into that nation's
discount rate. Second, world history has made human rights compliance a
prominent signal. International human rights came of age after World War
11.68 An imperialistic Germany had drawn the world into war and commit-
ted the worst human rights atrocities the twentieth century had seen.69 The
two evils-international aggression and human rights abuses-were per-
ceived as twin manifestations of a high-discount state. A state willing to
abuse the human rights of its own was more likely to engage in opportunis-
tic behavior against other states. Respect for human rights became an obvi-
ous signal of a low-discount state. The Cold War served to strengthen the
perceived logic. In that conflict, the threat to international stability, in the
eyes of the West, came from a nation characterized by totalitarian control
64 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 20-21.
65 Cf. McAdams, supra note 17, at 676-78. McAdams argues that signaling through behaviors gen-
erated by norm entrepreneurs cannot account for all the social norm observance that occurs, given the
fact that an individual can create a reputation for cooperativeness through other, more efficient means:
namely, actually being cooperative and engaging in behaviors that naturally distinguish cooperative and
uncooperative types even before the behaviors are recognized as signals. Id. This criticism is less per-
suasive when applied in the human rights arena. Arguably, human rights compliance is a natural signal
of the cooperative type. See infra text accompanying note 129. Moreover, in international relations,
where the character and fortunes of nations can change relatively quickly, signaling may play a com-
paratively larger role than it does in the social norms context. Finally, in spite of globalization, there are
likely fewer signals in international relations than there are norms governing the multitude of daily so-
cial interactions. Nonetheless, the fact remains that a nation may see less need to comply with human
rights if it has adequately communicated its type through other means.
66 See Elmer J. Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 443, 463 (2002) (arguing that
the importance of complying with a norm "will vary from norm to norm and from situation to situa-
tion").
67 See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 58, at 562; Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 668. This
statement assumes that human rights govern a nation's treatment of its own population. To the extent
human rights extend to a nation's treatment of the population of another state, as humanitarian law does,
noncompliance may directly affect another state and evoke retaliation.
68 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 105, 109-10, 125 (1999);
Krasner, supra note 12, at 165; Goldsmith & Posner II, supra note 7, at 672; Jack Donnelly, Interna-
tional Human Rights: A Regime Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599, 614-15 (1986).
69 See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (3d ed. 1999) (describ-
ing how the Holocaust demonstrated the need for international protection of human rights).
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over other states and disrespect for human rights.70  In light of these two
formative periods in world history, human rights has become a prominent
signal. As a result, a nation seeking to establish a reputation as low-
discount has incentive to engage in some degree of human rights compli-
ance in addition to its other signaling.
As the above discussion illustrates, in addition to the basic costs and
incentives of signaling, many other factors may influence whether a state
ultimately signals or requires a signal before cooperating. Thus, while sig-
naling theory explains an important dynamic influencing nations' decisions
regarding compliance, it does not provide a comprehensive explanation of
nations' actions. 7' Signaling decisions take place within the larger frame-
work of a nation's self-interest.
C. Complications in Signaling Theory
Moreover, in practice, the signaling dynamic is complicated by a few
considerations that are worthy of note. First, not every act relating to hu-
man rights serves as an independent signal. Information on states' human
rights practices is hard to obtain.72 Official international monitoring is
minimal. Reports by states may be skeletal or propagandistic, 73 or may not
be filed at all. 74 NGOs can only do so much to gather information. 7" And
unless they gain currency with their domestic constituencies as a result, in-
dividual states often lack strong incentives to engage in widespread moni-
toring. Even if they attempted to do so, they would have a difficult time
penetrating other nations to gather information. As a result, nations gener-
ally remain unaware of many of the actions other states take with respect to
human rights.76 Some actions, of course, attract widespread publicity.
70 See JERVIS, supra note 24, at 34 (noting the American perception "that Communist regimes are
apt to follow expansionist foreign policies").
71 Cf Farber, supra note 16, at 97 (recognizing that even if certain behavior primarily results from
motivations besides signaling, the benefits of signaling may influence behavior at the margin).
72 Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2012.
73 Krasner, supra note 12, at 164.
74 According to Hathaway, "[t]here are 1203 overdue reports in the human rights treaty system,
while only 1613 reports have ever been considered. Seventy-one percent of all state parties to human
rights treaties have overdue reports, and 110 states have 5 or more overdue reports." Hathaway, supra
note 1, at 1960 n.101; see also CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 23 (recognizing that "compliance
with reporting requirements" is "seriously deficient in human rights treaties").
75 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 58 & n.188.
76 Richard McAdams argues that preference for risk may also influence whether a state is willing to
deviate and chance detection. See McAdams, supra note 17, at 672. Risk preference makes it difficult to
correctly interpret signals that communicate discount rate. Id. Arguably, risk preference does not present
the same degree of difficulty where compliance, at least in part, signals restraint. Indeed, risk preference
may be a component of restraint. The more restrained a state is, the less likely it will be to risk detection.
Regardless whether risk preference is a component of restraint, any detected violation will reflect
poorly on a nation's level of restraint. Of course, the degree to which the deviation signals a lack of re-
straint will vary, at a minimum, with the probability of detection.
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These actions may individually serve as signals. Many times, however,
human rights signals consist of general perceptions of performance in an
area rather than individual actions in individual cases.77 Signaling pressures
thus inform a nation's practices in a more diffuse sense rather than dictating
how a nation acts in each situation affecting human rights.
Second, human rights signals do not send categorical messages. They do
not identify whether a nation will always cooperate or always defect in interna-
tional endeavors.7 Rather, they suggest the likelihood that a nation will coop-
erate by suggesting its discount rate, or level of reslraint. The estimate of a
nation's discount rate may also be influenced, among other things, by a nation's
past conduct, its governmental structure, its regional affiliation, and other
modes of signaling.79 Nations consider this range of inputs in determining
whether to cooperate. The decision whether to cooperate is likewise not cate-
gorical, but continuous.80 Thus, nations generally determine how far to cooperate
or on which issues to cooperate, rather than whether to engage a nation at all.
Third, signaling behaviors do not invariably separate low-discount
states from high-discount states. 8' If signaling will secure sufficient bene-
fits or if the cost of a particular signal is low, even high-discount states may
find it in their interest to signal. 82 This mimicry of the low-discount types
diminishes the amount of information a partner state can extract from the
signaling behavior.83 All other things being equal, the partner state can
conclude that countries that do not engage in the behavior have higher dis-
count rates than those that do, but absent variability in the degree of signal-
ing behavior, the partner state cannot easily determine the relative discount
rates of those that do participate in the behavior.84
Fourth, and relatedly, compliance with human rights principles is less
costly for some nations than for others.8 5 A nation's domestic constituency
may have a preference for human rights compliance, for example.86 When
77 Cf. CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 17 (recognizing that compliance with treaty obligations
"is not an on-off phenomenon"); Hathaway, supra note 1, at 22 (same).
78 See Schaefer, supra note 66, at 454 (noting that "[a] willingness to cooperate in one context need
not cany over to other contexts").
79 See Farber, supra note 16, at 96-97; Kydd, supra note 42, at 331-32.
80 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 20.
s] See id. at 19-20.
82 See id.; Kydd, supra note 42, at 339. As one example, observing the prohibition against genocide is
relatively costless for most nations. As a result, even high-discount states will likely observe this prohibition.
The fact that a nation has not committed genocide thus communicates little about the nation's discount rate.
83 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 19-20; Morrow, supra note 20, at 87-88, 90.
84 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 20.
85 Cf id. at 21-22.
86 See Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG.
661, 674 (2000). Explanations of domestic preferences are varied. See, e.g., id. at 667-70 (discussing
domestic political explanations of the preference for international legalization). This Essay need not
choose among these explanations, but simply recognizes that preferences exist and influence state be-
havior. Cf. Guzman, supra note 1, at 1841.
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the domestic audience demands compliance, the compliance signal is less
costly to send. If domestic demands are sufficient to cause the state to engage
in signaling behavior, the behavior will not signal type.8 7 If, on the other
hand, compliance imposes costs beyond the domestic benefits it achieves,
compliance may yet send a signal. By way of analogy, suppose that I am an
employer who wishes to hire workers who value their health. I believe that
workers who value their health will be sick less often and will be more pro-
ductive. I take you out to lunch while interviewing you for a job. You might
enjoy a hamburger and onion rings, but you have a cholesterol problem and
your doctor has advised you to avoid fats and eat green leafy vegetables or
risk heart problems. From a medical standpoint, it might be fine if you order
a small serving of onion rings. Nonetheless, you order a spinach salad with
dressing on the side. You have an independent constraint that inspired your
order in part. But ordering spinach salad and no onion rings can still serve as
a signal to me that you value your health,88 given the fact that your order im-
posed costs beyond those medically necessary.89
Similarly, when nations act consistently with international human
rights principles in part because of domestic constraints, they may nonethe-
less send a signal. Given the ambiguous cost of the action, however, re-
ceiving nations may discount the strength of the signal. Thus, while the
United States acts consistently with many international human rights prin-
ciples, other nations may not interpret these actions as indicating a low dis-
count rate as much as a domestic preference or requirement for the actions
taken.90 By contrast, compliance by nations facing weak domestic pressure
for compliance is more likely to be motivated by signaling interests. Any
uncertainty about the degree to which behavior is motivated by domestic
preference lessens the effectiveness of the signal.9'
While the aggregate nature of signals, the continuous character of co-
operation, the existence of partial pooling, and the difference in costliness
of signals alter the effectiveness of human rights signals, they do not pre-
vent signaling from playing a role in international human rights compli-
ance. 92 Recognizing, however, that the decision to signal may be affected
87 See McAdams, supra note 17, at 651, 671-72; Wendel, supra note 31, at 32-34 (exploring the
difficulties that may arise when signaling behaviors result from nonsignaling motivations).
88 Of course, in order to accurately interpret the signal, I need information regarding your cost struc-
ture, information that may not always be available.
89 The cost of ordering a spinach salad may also be so small that people who are not health con-
scious will mimic the behavior of those who are by ordering the spinach in this one-time lunch appoint-
ment. If we ate all our meals together for an extended period, the cost of mimicking would increase and
the risk of pooling decline.
90 Information regarding domestic preferences may nonetheless be valuable to another state.
91 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 21-22, 27; SPENCE, supra note 20, at 27, 47-48 & n.6; McAdams,
supra note 17, at 671-72.
92 Admittedly, however, it is difficult to capture empirically the role that signaling actually plays.
See supra note 19.
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by other influences, the question becomes, when is signaling most likely to
occur? This question can be broken down into at least three related ques-
tions: Along which lines of international interaction is signaling most in-
fluential? What types of nations are most likely to signal? What types of
nations are most likely to expect signaling before engaging another state?
Part III turns to these questions.
III. THE DOMAIN OF HUMAN RIGHTS SIGNALING
International interaction roughly occurs along three planes: military,
diplomatic, and economic. Human rights signaling will play its most sig-
nificant role in fostering economic and diplomatic relations, while playing a
less significant role in military interactions.93 Military interactions possess
a positive quality that economic and diplomatic relations typically do not.
That is, while economic and diplomatic power is generally exerted through
withholding, military interests are also advanced through affirmative acts of
might. As a result, cooperation plays a more hegemonic role in the eco-
nomic and diplomatic arenas than in military matters. Because signals fa-
cilitate cooperation, signaling will be more prominent in the diplomatic and
economic realms.9 4
In addition, military interests, concerned as they are with national secu-
rity, rank among the most basic interests of sovereign states.95 As a result,
states will tend to enter relations with other nations in pursuit of these inter-
ests, even in the absence of extensive assurances from human rights signal-
ing, particularly as the military interests at stake increase in importance.
9 6
Diplomatic and economic interactions, on the other hand, tend to serve in-
terests that are less fundamental. Diplomatic relations maintain the chan-
nels of communication between countries. Economic endeavors improve
wealth. Both these interests may be critical to security, but they may not be
as well. Because these interests are less fundamental, interactions with
other nations in these arenas will be more highly influenced by human
rights signaling.
Of course, basic diplomatic interactions occur at a very fundamental
level as well, facilitating the very existence of international interaction. As a
result, signaling also plays a relatively minor role in the establishment of ba-
sic diplomacy. However, once diplomatic ties are established, signaling may
93 Cf Guzman, supra note 1, at 1851 (stating reputational theory "predicts that intemational law
will have a greater impact on economic matters than on military and security matters").
94 But cf McAdams, supra note 17, at 664-66 (ignoring the fact that the role of cooperation in a
given area of intemational interaction affects the extent of signaling in that area).
95 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1874.
96 Cf id. at 1874 (finding it unlikely that reputational concerns "will be enough to change a coun-
try's course of action from violation to compliance" in critical areas such as national security). Human
rights signaling will likely play an increased role in multilateral military relations, where the need for
cooperation is greater.
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significantly affect the intimacy and tone of those ties. By contrast, signaling
can play a relatively significant role in the development of economic rela-
tions, which greatly depend on cooperation. The role of signaling in eco-
nomic relations may decrease in importance, however, once a country has
established a reputation of respecting its economic obligations.97
Finally, when relations expand beyond bilateral ties in any realm, the
role of signaling may also expand. Regional or multilateral compacts, like
the E.U., often require greater cooperation, both because of their multilat-
eral character and because they espouse unifying policies. The demand for
signaling may increase with this greater need for cooperation. As a result,
membership in these organizations may carry an implicit, if not explicit,
expectation of signaling.98 Of course, the pressure to engage in signaling
behavior might be explained by other influences. Members of the compact
may have a preference for the behavior. Alternatively, the compact may be
attempting to send a unified signal to other nations of the world or to obtain
the benefits of signal entrepreneurship by claiming ownership of the signal
for the compact. The European Union's demand for human rights compli-
ance as a prerequisite for membership might be explained by one or all of
these dynamics. 99
Having briefly assessed, albeit at a high level of abstraction and gener-
ality, the relative role of signaling in the basic arenas of international rela-
tions, it remains unanswered the type of nation that is most likely to signal.
As explained above, the decision whether to signal occurs in the context of
a broader self-interest calculation that takes account of the benefits that may
be obtained with and without signaling. If a nation offers a unique benefit,
such as large oil reserves, the nation may not need to engage. in consistent
signaling to attract international cooperation. Such has been the case with
Saudi Arabia. Similarly, if a nation is so prominent that it cannot be ig-
nored, it may not have to signal extensively to engage other countries.
Thus, China with its vast potential and the United States with its economic
and military might need not engage in consistent signaling in order to at-
tract international engagement.
Nations that lack these unique benefits and prominence, by contrast,
have greater need to assure potential partners that they will cooperate. As a
result, we would expect more signaling from countries like Mexico or Nige-
ria100 than from China. Similarly, we might expect signaling from countries
97 But see supra note 50.
98 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2017-18 (noting the previously implicit and now explicit Euro-
pean Union requirement of human rights compliance).
99 Andrew Moravcsik has noted that emerging Western democracies have followed Europe's lead in
accepting the jurisdiction of a regional human rights court, suggesting that European efforts at signal
entrepreneurship have been successful. Moravcsik, supra note 51, at 27.
100 At least some of Nigeria's signaling has been influenced by the litigative and investigative ef-
forts of an NGO within Nigeria that has increased the publicity of human rights problems. See CHAYES
& CHAYES, supra note 5, at 253-54.
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attempting to secure the gains of signal entrepreneurship. At the other ex-
treme, countries that perceive greater gains from opposing rather than coop-
erating with certain states that desire signals can be expected to ignore those
signals. States like Iraq fall into this category.
Just as the likelihood of signaling is affected by the type of interaction
and nation at issue, the likelihood that a potential partner will demand sig-
naling before engaging another country depends on the character and rela-
tive positions of the two countries. Countries that cannot walk away from a
potential relationship without incurring significant opportunity costs are in a
weak position to demand signaling. Germany, for example, would have
difficulty requiring signals from Saudi Arabia before purchasing oil if Ger-
many could not satisfy its demands elsewhere without large costs. To state
the point more generally, sellers are in a stronger position to demand signal-
ling in a sellers' market, while buyers assume that position in a buyers'
market.
Additionally, a partner state is more likely to demand a signal in situa-
tions where the past performance of a country has demonstrated a high dis-
count rate. Thus, if a country has a history of serious human rights
violations or of defection in cooperative endeavors, a partner state is more
likely to require current signaling before engaging that state. 1 1 For exam-
ple, England would be more likely to require Sudan to engage in human
rights signaling before pursuing extensive economic relations than it would
be to require the same of Thailand. Similarly, a partner state may expect
signaling where a change, such as a change in leadership or policy, has
called a nation's character into question.
Finally, developed Western nations appear more likely to require sig-
naling than other countries. Aside from the relative strength of these coun-
tries and the preferences of their domestic constituencies, history may
explain why these nations appear to rely more heavily on signaling behav-
iors than other countries. As noted above, international human rights came
of age after World War II. While the war reiterated that international stabil-
ity may be a national concern, the war also placed the West, and particu-
larly the United States, in a position of economic and military strength.
Western powers were posed to exert their military influence and to take ad-
vantage of economic opportunities in increasingly global markets. 02
Given their economic and military might and their role in monitoring
and promoting international stability, the Western powers had an interest in
101 Cf Kydd, supra note 42, at 340-50 (tracing the series of signals required to convince the West
of the Soviet Union's transformation at the end the Cold War); Farber, supra note 16, at 95 (noting that
"new regimes have the strongest need to signal their future intentions," while a nation like Britain with
"several centuries of experience with an independent judiciary and enforcement of contract and property
rights.... has little need to send any special signal about these conditions").
102 See. e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Economics and International Law, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473,
478-79 (1997) (presenting statistics regarding the enormous expansion of international trade and foreign
direct investment in the years since World War II).
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identifying nations that could be trusted both to forego the types of interna-
tional opportunism that would trigger conflict and to cooperate in joint en-
deavors. This type of information about the many nations of the world was
not readily available, however. Lacking perfect information, nations came
to rely on signals, including respect for human rights, that could identify re-
strained states.103
In light of the context in which modem human rights developed, it is
unsurprising that many of these rights have a Western character.104 The
Western nations were sellers in a sellers' market and sought signals that in
Western eyes would identify the cooperative type. 105 Of course, contempo-
rary human rights are not exclusively Western and have attained a signifi-
cant degree of international acceptance. Nonetheless, it still appears more
likely that a developed Western nation will require human rights signaling
in support of cooperation than a developed non-Western nation like Japan
would. History provides a plausible account for this tendency.10 6
IV. GENERAL INSIGHTS FROM SIGNALING THEORY
Having sketched the dynamics that inform signaling as well as the con-
text in which signaling has its greatest impact, I turn to a few questions in
international law that signaling theory helps to answer. At the outset, sig-
naling theory illuminates why human rights instruments are created in the
first place. A state need not ratify a human rights treaty in order to signal.
A state could communicate its discount rate by engaging in visible human
rights protection regardless whether there is a treaty. However, as briefly
noted above, signaling requires that both senders and receivers know that
the action in question is a signal. 10 7
To illustrate, suppose that a person travels to a foreign country where
103 Cf Goldsmith & Posner 11, supra note 7, at 670 (asserting that the powerful nations' interest in
promoting stability and security after the world wars led to "an expansion of human rights concerns").
104 See AN-NA'IM, supra note 58, at 428; Krasner, supra note 12, at 161, 164-66 (noting that the
Western slant of contemporary human rights results from the relative strength of Western nations).
105 But cf L. Amede Obiora: Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and Compara-
tive Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 669, 673-74 & n.12 (1998).
106 The historical account of the rise of human rights compliance as a signal is consistent with Gold-
smith and Posner's signaling-based explanation for the moral and legal content of international rhetoric.
According to that explanation, "the history of international discursive practices reflects shifts in payoffs
from coordinating with different nations. When returns from coordination are maximized by dealing
with a small number of countries with similar traditions and values, talk will appeal to relatively specific
values-religious (Christian), regional (Europe), racial, and so forth." Goldsmith & Posner Ill, supra
note 20, at 134; see also id. at 139. While much of international rhetoric historically focused on Chris-
tian values, then European values, then the values of civilized nations, since the mid-1 900s the rhetoric
has centered on respect for human rights. Id. at 134-35. This new focus complements the theory that
since World War II human rights compliance has been used to identify states with which cooperation
would be desirable.
107 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 23, 31; Wendel, supra note 31, at 35 (noting the ambiguity that
results when senders and receivers do not share a common understanding of signaling behaviors).
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different social norms, or signals, are used. In the traveler's native society,
tipping a server might be unheard of, while giving money to one in need is
customary. In the society visited, by contrast, tipping might be expected
and giving to those in need an optional sign of beneficence. Unaware of
these differences, the traveler provides money to the homeless person on the
street, but fails to tip the server. Similarly unaware of the differences in
norms, the server perceives the traveler as cheap, while the homeless person
sees her as generous. A lack of mutual understanding of what constitutes
the signal prevents perception of the traveler's true character.
In order for signals to operate properly then, their content must be well
known. 1° 8 States interested in communicating their cooperative character
and in identifying low-discount partners have an incentive to clarify the be-
haviors that will signal this information. Given its ambiguity, mere custom
is a relatively ineffective vehicle for this purpose. 10 9 International instru-
ments-from binding treaties to hortatory resolutions-are more effective.
These written documents define the agreed-upon behaviors that will serve
as signals, making both signaling and its absence more readily identifiable
on the international stage." 0 Written documents also help to educate na-
tions about signaling behaviors because the documents are typically created
in international conference and can be easily distributed throughout the
world. This educational function serves to reduce the problem of the for-
eign traveler. The increase in human rights instruments since World War II
has helped to make human rights compliance a more effective signal.
The question arises, however, why nations would accede to interna-
tional human rights instruments. The answer lies in the fact that accession,
like compliance, can serve as a signal of restraint. Typically, accession to
international human rights instruments costs little. Accession may intensify
the monitoring and shaming efforts of transnational actors and raise other
nations' expectations of compliance with the risk of greater reputational
costs if a signatory deviates,"' but accession rarely triggers more than
minimal monitoring and enforcement by an authoritative organization.'12
108 Cf Schaefer, supra note 66, at 457-58 (noting difficulties that arise when the content of norms is
unclear).
109 Within the realm of custom, certain behaviors will be more clearly defined as signals than oth-
ers. Cf Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 14, at 892 (noting that different international "norms com-
mand[] different levels of agreement").
110 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1840 (suggesting that international institutions, such as interna-
tional law, "can reduce [both] verification costs ... [and] the cost of punishing cheaters"); Kahler, supra
note 86, at 663 (arguing that legalization reduces "the costs of monitoring and lower[s] the bar for en-
forcement actions"). Written instruments do not, of course, remove all ambiguity, but they go a long
way toward eliminating it.
I I I See Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in
International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 819, 819, 821 (2000).
112 See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2014-15 (detailing that even the additional enforcement
mechanisms of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and of
Article 21 to the Torture Convention "tend not to be particularly effective" in practice).
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On the other hand, the failure to accede risks the cost of being classed with
unrestrained states.1 13 As a result, both high- and low-discount states pool
around accession."14 Accession separates states into two rough pools: (1)
ratifying states which may be low-discount, but may also be mimickers and
(2) nonratifying states whose discount rates may be fairly low, but whose
failure to accede suggests that they at least have higher discount rates than
those that both accede and intend to comply.
Over time, the states' actual practices separate them further into four
rough categories: acceding and complying states, acceding and noncomply-
ing states, nonacceding and complying states, and nonacceding and non-
complying states. The acceding and complying states have demonstrated
the lowest discount rates by both committing to and complying with the
treaty provisions. That is, they have demonstrated their restraint not only
by agreeing to abide, but by actually abiding by their agreement.
The acceding and noncomplying states as well as the nonacceding and
complying states form a middle tier, in which discount rates vary consid-
erably. At one extreme, those states that do not accede but comply demon-
strate a relatively low discount rate, qualified by deliberate retention of the
right to deviate from treaty principles. The United States often finds itself
in this category with regard to human rights treaties, as it acts consistently
with many treaty principles, but refuses to be bound by them through un-
qualified accession."' At the other extreme are states that accede but do
not comply. These states recognize the value of a perception of compliance
and find that ratification buys them the significant benefit of not being as
readily identified as deviant. However, their accession provides less cover
once their noncompliance becomes apparent.16
In the last category are nations that disregard even the perception of
acceding to the instrument. These states are analogous to a foreign traveler
who learns of his host society's norms and publicly rejects them, in princi-
ple and in practice. These states value maintenance of their full range of
power and, as discussed below, may benefit by demonstrating opposition to
mainstream signals. The decision whether to accede helps to distinguish
these four groups, even though alone it does little to separate them. That is,
accession acts as a signal, but standing alone is able to communicate very
''3 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 190-91. The risk of being grouped with the unrestrained states
through nonaccession is greatest for smaller states that lack the ability to widely publicize and defend
their potential reasons for nonaccession. As a result, less prominent states are likely to feel greater pres-
sure to accede to avoid negative characterization.
114 The costs of accession and the separation achieved by the accession signal could be increased by
requiring "countries to demonstrate compliance with certain human rights standards before" allowing
them "to join a human rights treaty." Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2024.
115 See Goldsmith & Posner III, supra note 20, at 117-18 (noting that "[t]he United States has
signed and ratified many human rights treaties with conditions or reservations ... that narrow the trea-
ties' obligations to rights already guaranteed by domestic law").
116 See POSNER, supra note 17, at 191-92; McAdams, supra note 17, at 659.
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little information because of extensive pooling.
Signaling theory not only casts light on the decision to accede, but
helps to explain recent empirical findings regarding compliance following
accession. After an extensive statistical analysis of compliance with vari-
ous human rights treaties, Oona Hathaway found "that ratification of re-
gional human rights treaties is not infrequently associated with worse than
expected human rights practices. '17 Hathaway attempts to explain this
counterintuitive finding based on the expressive role of treaties. She argues
that because treaty ratification allows a country to express its support,
whether sincere or not, for the principles embodied in the treaty, ratification
diffuses pressure on the country to actually comply with the treaty." 8 She
suggests that "[r]atification of regional human rights treaties may be more
often and more markedly associated with worse human rights [practices]
than is ratification of universal human rights treaties because regional" de-
pendencies create greater incentive to accede to a regional treaty even if a
country does not yet conform, or intend to conform, to the principles in the
treaty.119
Hathaway's theory provides a possible explanation for why a state
would ratify a regional treaty, but offers little explanation for why the state
would then engage in worse practices over any substantial period of time.
If states in a region exert such pressure toward compliance, presumably the
smokescreen of ratification would wear thin if a country did not also adhere
to the treaty in practice. Invoking the difficulty of observing countries' ac-
tual practices surely does not provide a complete response, particularly
given the proximity of countries in the same region.
Signaling theory offers a more persuasive explanation for the lack of
compliance that Hathaway observed. Countries in the same region often
share political, cultural, linguistic, and other characteristics. At a minimum,
they tend to have had extended histories with each other. As a result, they
are more familiar with each other's characteristics. Because of this famili-
arity, they have less need to rely on signals to estimate type. 120
On the other hand, there may be strong incentives to ratify a regional
treaty. Failure to sign a regional treaty when the costs of signing are small
suggests antagonism toward neighboring participants. Ratification prevents
117 Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1995; see also id. at 2000, 2004, 2016. This finding and my explana-
tion of it aggregate experiences under different regional treaties. For findings for the individual treaties
analyzed, see id. at 1995-97. For criticism of Hathaway's underlying data which bears on the accuracy
of her results, see DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS-LAW, POLICY AND
PROCESS (3d ed. Supp. 2001), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/intlhr/Chapter%2017%20
rev.doc (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
118 Hathaway, supra note 2, at 2016-19; see also id. at 2004-09, 2020.
1i9 See id. at 2016, 2020.
120 Cf Farber, supra note 16, at 95 (noting that "signals are most needed by outsiders"). The signal-
ing environment between countries that have long been allies may be similar to that of countries within
the same region.
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this inference. Ratification likewise prevents a country from being at a com-
parative disadvantage to ratifying neighbors with which it likely competes.' 2'
The treaty also serves to distill the benefits enjoyed by the entrepreneurs of
more universal signals by claiming ownership of those signals for the region.
At the same time, the regional treaty, particularly if it has ostensible enforce-
ment mechanisms, may send a signal to the rest of the world regarding the
discount rates of those in the region. 2 2  Accordingly, the treaty may have
served its highest purposes, from the states' perspective, upon ratification, for
at ratification it can accomplish all these tasks. Once these tasks have been
accomplished, countries within the region have less incentive to send addi-
tional signals under the treaty, for these signals are less important among the
familiar states within the region and the treaty itself has sent a signal to the
rest of the world. Signaling theory thus helps to explain why one might find
worse compliance than expected following ratification of regional treaties.
The dynamics of signaling likewise aid understanding of the march
toward more demanding and law-like human rights regimes.'23 As ex-
plained, human rights compliance communicates private, nonverifiable in-
formation about a state's discount rate. Low-discount states can generally
send compliance signals more cheaply than high-discount states. However,
pooling results as the costs of signaling behaviors decrease, the incentives
to incur those costs increase, or high-discount states acquire the ability to
engage in signaling behaviors more cheaply through, for example, NGO ef-
forts to increase states' capacities. In the face of pooling, lower discount
states have an incentive to reach for more costly ways to distinguish them-
selves. Similarly, states press for more costly signals to secure the benefits
of signal entrepreneurship. Thus, in the human rights arena, there is pres-
sure to submit to increased monitoring and enforcement. A low-discount
state that already tends to comply with the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights might give in to that pressure by submitting to the addi-
tional enforcement mechanisms of the Optional Protocol. 124  Indeed,
121 Cf. Simmons, supra note I 11, at 821, 824, 827, 832 (expecting "policy convergence, especially
among countries whose venues are near substitutes for one another" and finding empincal evidence that
an increase in the number of nations acceding to Article VIII of the IMF Articles of Agreement in-
creases the likelihood of accession by an uncommitted nation).
122 The incentive to participate in the signal becomes greater as more nations within the region ac-
cede to the treaty, for then nonaccession sends a strong negative signal. See Beth A. Simmons, Money
and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 323, 324-
25 (2000); cf Farber, supra note 16, at 96.
123 Signaling theory does not provide a complete explanation of this process. Domestic preferences,
for example, are undoubtedly a major catalyst in strengthening human rights regimes. For a discussion
of various factors that may affect legalization, see Kahler, supra note 86, at 661-72, 680-82.
124 See Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2014-15 (describing the enforcement mechanisms of the Op-
tional Protocol, which, in practice, are fairly weak). Hathaway explains that the Protocol's enforcement
mechanisms discourage countries that do not intend to comply from ratifying merely to obtain the ex-
pressive benefits of ratification. Id. at 2015. In the language of signaling theory, ratification of the Op-
tional Protocol is too costly for high-discount states, but serves as a signal for low-discount states.
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Hathaway found that states with better human rights practices are more
likely to have accepted the Optional Protocol. 2 Each step toward in-
creased monitoring and enforcement shows greater cooperativeness. As
signals become enforceable, they come to resemble domestic law. This
transition from signal to traditional law is facilitated by the fact that signals
identify cooperative types. As a result, signaling behaviors partake of the
normative quality of traditional law. 126
V. INSIGHTS FROM SIGNALING THEORY FOR PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE
Signaling theory not only helps to explain the international human
rights phenomena discussed above, it provides valuable insights for promot-
ing human rights compliance. At the outset, one might question whether
signaling theory is compatible with a view toward advancing human rights.
The most accurate response is that signaling theory is purely descriptive.
The theory attempts to capture the way states actually behave and the reali-
ties, conscious or not, that motivate that behavior.'27 By modeling the self-
interested way in which nations comply with or deviate from international
human rights principles, signaling theory helps us to better understand the
forces affecting human rights.
At the same time, nothing about signaling theory diminishes the value
of human rights. While signals need not have a "necessary or intrinsic con-
nection to the beliefs that they provoke,"' 28 they may have such a connec-
tion. Indeed, human rights compliance is a signal that correlates well with
the message it is theorized to convey. Adherence to human rights standards
indicates that a nation is willing to incur the immediate costs of rights pro-
tection and is correspondingly more likely to forego opportunism in interna-
tional interactions. Human rights compliance is thus associated with the
positive qualities of restraint and cooperativeness.
Moreover, signaling theory recognizes that signals may both facilitate
cooperation and produce external benefits.129 For example, the signal of
protecting free speech might both facilitate cooperation among nations with
low discount rates and benefit society at large by advancing democracy and
125 Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1987; see also id. at 1999-2000, 2004. However, Hathaway did not
find a statistically significant relationship between ratification of the Optional Protocol and the commu-
nity of nations' subsequent practices with regard to certain rights covered by the Protocol: namely, fair
trials and civil liberties. Id. at 1994; see also id. at 1999-2000 & n.210.
126 The difficulty scholars have encountered in determining the legal status of international human
rights principles may have resulted, in part, from the fact that these principles are in transit along the sig-
nal-to-law continuum.
127 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 38, at 125 (arguing that game theory need not "recreate the exact
process by which individuals make the decisions that they do" for game theory to be able to predict
those decisions through the solution concepts it employs).
128 POSNER, supra note 17, at 22-23.
129 Id. at 33.
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development and by validating individual autonomy and dignity. Thus,
while human rights compliance need not assume normative significance in
the context of signaling theory, signaling theory does not preclude the un-
derstanding that human rights have normative import. and produce social
benefit. As a matter of methodology, not values, the theory simply does not
delve into these issues in its attempt to distill the signaling dynamic at work
in the human rights arena.
Understanding signaling, however, reveals ways in which compliance
might be increased. Assuming self-interested action as it does, signaling
theory highlights that human rights compliance is best promoted by altering
the payoffs a state receives through compliance. These payoffs can be
changed in three prominent ways-by increasing capacity for compliance,
by changing domestic preferences, and by publicizing state practices.
These avenues are not new,3 0 but their potential effects are illuminated by
the signaling model.
Some states are constrained from complying by lack of capacity. 3 '
These states may not, for example, possess the institutions or culture that
facilitate rights protection. 32 Efforts that cultivate capacity-training and
education programs for judges, for example-make it less costly for these
states to send compliance signals. Incidentally, some of these efforts might
also increase the economic attractiveness of a state.'33 Economic opportu-
130 Cf Hathaway, supra note 1, at 2022-23 (advocating increased monitoring and publicity); id. at
2025 (arguing that the U.N. and regional bodies should work to increase countries' capacities for com-
pliance).
131 Obiora, supra note 105, at 676; cf McAdams, supra note 17, at 672-73 (noting that differences
in wealth affect the amount of signaling players engage in). Indeed, in recognition of states' limited ca-
pacity, it is expressly recognized that social and economic rights are to be progressively realized. Maria
Green, What We Talk About When We Talk About Indicators: Current Approaches to Human Rights
Measurement, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1070 (2001).
132 it can be difficult to discern whether a nation lacks the ability to develop capacity on its own or
lacks the restraint necessary to do so. McAdams explores a similarly difficult situation in which some
good types have inconsistent discount rates. Some have a low discount rate when choosing between two
future benefits, but a bias toward present benefits when choosing between a present benefit and a future
benefit. That is, they are impulsive. If these inconsistent good types have a mechanism whereby they
can commit themselves to choose future benefits, they can act the same as consistent good types who
always prefer future benefits. However, if the opportunity to self-commit is itself unobservable, there is
no way to distinguish inconsistent good types who lack the opportunity to self-commit from those who
do not avail themselves of that opportunity. McAdams, supra note 17, at 655-61, 673. Similarly, if an
observer cannot determine whether a nation lacks the resources to develop capacity or lacks the restraint
necessary to do so, it is impossible to accurately determine the nation's type. Whatever the nation's
type, capacity development reduces the cost of compliance and can thereby increase signaling behavior.
133 See Farber, supra note 16, at 83, 91-92 (noting "the [apparent] current consensus among
economists" of "the importance of an independent judiciary to development"); Michael J. Trebilcock,
What Makes Poor Countries Poor?: The Role of Institutional Capital in Economic Development, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 15, 40-44 (Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997) (suggest-
ing that developments in the legal system may facilitate economic growth, though noting a contrary
view). But cf. id. at 20-25 (noting disagreement regarding whether democracy, with its attendant politi-
cal rights, fosters economic growth); Posner, supra note 24, at 3 (recommending modest legal reform
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nity attracts the type of cooperative endeavors that can provide an incentive
to signal.
However, focusing exclusively on developing economic capacity can
be problematic in the long run, for economic strength can serve both to en-
courage and excuse signaling. Economic development increases the cost of
remaining an outlier and attracts countries that wish to enter cooperative ar-
rangements. Depending on the size of the gains, these potential partners
may require signaling. Once the potential gains from interaction reach a
certain tipping point, however, countries may be willing to forego assur-
ances of cooperation before engaging. As a result, signaling theory sug-
gests that economic development may have conflicting effects on human
rights compliance. 3 4 Contrary to the view that legal reform in developing
countries should focus "on creating substantive and procedurally efficient
rules of contract and property rights rather than on creating a first-class ju-
diciary or an extensive system of civil liberties,""13 then, signaling theory
suggests that a disproportionate focus on economic development is unwise.
Developing simultaneous capacity for compliance is also critical.
Yet states typically lack strong incentives to develop another country's
capacity to comply. Economic gains provide some incentive. Creating a
more democratic or loyal state might as well. But finding other strong in-
centives, outside domestic demands for promoting human rights, is an elu-
sive task.136 Consequently, groups interested in human rights compliance
may not be able to rely on states to carry the responsibility of capacity
building. NGOs may need to shoulder a large share of this burden by pro-
viding the necessary financial resources and personnel, or by generating
domestic demand in wealthy countries, for such efforts.
Changing domestic demands can have a profound impact on compli-
ance. One way to achieve this change is to publicize not simply violations
of human rights, but also the type of cost-benefit analysis that signaling
theory suggests states conduct in determining whether to comply. Citizens
initially "[g]iven the risk that too heavy an initial investment in legal reform could deprive the produc-
tive economy of necessary resources and thus stifle legal and economic reforms"). Relatedly, the obser-
vance of certain human rights, such as equal opportunity for ethnic minorities, may directly affect the
economic capacity of a country. As a result, compliance with these rights may be a particularly relevant
signal.
134 Economic growth may have conflicting effects on compliance for other reasons as well. See
Hathaway, supra note 1, at 1990 & n.187 (citing sources for the conflicting propositions that economic
growth may increase noncompliance by destabilizing a country, thereby increasing repression, or may
minimize noncompliance by pacifying those who might otherwise rebel and face repression). Cf. Tre-
bilcock, supra note 133, at 21, 23 (identifying empirical and theoretical support for the idea that eco-
nomic growth results in greater pressure for democratization).
135 Posner, supra note 24, at 9.
136 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance with International Treaties: Lessons from Intentional Oil
Pollution, ENV'T, May 1995, at 10, 38 (recognizing that programs designed to build capacity for com-
pliance are unlikely to succeed due to "disputes over the causes of non-compliance and the reluctance of
developed countries to provide funding").
A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance
who believe rights have unique or uncompromising value will likely balk at
this cost-benefit approach (just as human rights scholars would justifiably
balk at the signaling theory outlined here if it were normative rather than
descriptive).'37 Even those who will tolerate a cost-benefit approach may
put a large premium on rights. These citizens may then pressure their gov-
ernments to place greater value on human rights compliance at home and
abroad. They have an incentive to do so to protect the value accorded their
own rights. 3 '
Domestic pressures can be particularly effective if translated into legisla-
tion that requires the government to condition its interaction with other na-
tions on human rights compliance.'39 Such legislation in effect singles out
human rights compliance from among many possible signals and makes it a
necessary signal. The legislation prevents the government from basing the
decision to engage nonsignaling states on a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis
and increases the costs of noncompliance for potential cooperative partners.
Gathering and publicizing information about states' compliance with hu-
man rights can also serve to change the payoffs of signaling. Publication of na-
tions' compliance increases the reach and thereby the benefit of the compliance
signal, increasing the incentive to engage in the signal. Conversely, increased
information about human rights abuses costs the abusing state as it reveals that
the state is unrestrained. 140 As a result, whether an international human rights
agreement has an effective reporting requirement that increases publicity of
states' practices may be more important for promoting compliance than
whether the agreement's guarantees are considered legally binding.
Regardless whether an agreement imposes a reporting requirement,
courts or other bodies evaluating state actions can increase publicity by cit-
ing pertinent human rights instruments, whether binding or hortatory, to ad-
vertise conformance with or divergence from human rights principles.'14
Developing more precise human rights rules can simplify the process of
identifying and publicizing compliance and deviation. 142 Precise rules also
137 See Farber, supra note 16, at 84 (noting that "many people would reject on moral grounds the
view that protection of human rights should bow to economic considerations"); cf POSNER, supra note
17, at 193-94 (noting the debate regarding whether incommensurabilty reflects "a different kind of
value" or an infinite degree of value).
138 Cf Kahler, supra note 86, at 669 (noting that "groups-and governments themselves-choose
legalized international institutions to bind governments to particular domestic policies").
139 But cf. Horton & Sellier, supra note 45 (illustrating the ineffectiveness of legislation that condi-
tions continued aid on executive certification of human rights compliance). Ongoing monitoring may be
necessary to ensure that the partner country continues to engage in signaling behavior even after interac-
tion has begun. See id. at 849-51.
140 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1862-63 (recognizing that the reputational effects of noncompli-
ance depend on the extent to which the violation is known).
141 Courts might also act as signal entrepreneurs by developing more stringent human rights stan-
dards.
142 See Guzman, supra note 1, at 1857; cf. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 14, at 900 (Clarifying a
norm cont-ibutes to its acceptance.).
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serve to minimize opportunities to comply only with the least restrictive re-
quirements of broad concepts of rights.1
43
Signaling theory suggests a final avenue for promoting compliance: uni-
versalizing human rights principles. 44 The theory highlights the difficulty that
arises when signaling behaviors are associated with a subset of states. Other
states may gain advantage by resisting the signals. To promote human rights
compliance among these states, then, it is not enough that powerful nations en-
dorse the signaling behaviors. Instead, the signals should be perceived as neu-
tral and universal. 145  A state might still obtain advantage by rejecting these
signals, but it will risk greater costs by spurning the wider international com-
munity. Similarly, a state will likely be less successful in diverting domestic
attention away from failure to engage in the signaling behaviors to opposition
toward the signaling states. Domestic audiences may, as a result, feel more in-
clined to insist on the signaling behaviors. Internationalization of human rights
principles may thus serve to increase global compliance.
CONCLUSION
The international human rights regime has grown significantly since
World War II. Nonetheless, for all the theorizing that has been done in recent
years about compliance with international law, a component of the compli-
ance equation for human rights has gone underappreciated. Signaling theory
captures that component: the attempt by states to communicate and gather in-
formation about each other through the costly act of human rights compli-
ance. Understanding this dynamic contributes to our understanding of when
nations are likely to comply with human rights principles and how compli-
ance may be increased. Signaling theory is thus an important addition to the
developing scholarship on compliance with international law.
143 See AN-NA'IM, supra note 58, at 431; cf. Guzman, supra note 1, at 1876 ("Because CIL's con-
tent is uncertain, states can often claim to have complied even when they have ignored the content of
CIL."); Schaefer, supra note 66, at 460 (noting that "a well-specified contract... discourages defection
because rationalization or assertions of fanciful exceptions are less likely").
144 The feasibility and overall desirability of universalization are difficult questions that lie beyond
the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., AN-NA'IM, supra note 58, at 429-30; Gustavo Esteva & Madhu Suri
Prakash, Human Rights: The Trojan Horse of Recolonization?, in GRASSROOTS AND POST-
MODERNISM: REMAKING THE SOIL OF CULTURES 110, 110-46 (1998); Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy,
Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation: Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity Within Uni-
versal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391 (2001); Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism:
A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 527
(2001); Vivian Groswold Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law's Potential for Broadening Le-
gal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 657,667 (1998); Obiora, supra note 105, at 669-70, 676-79; van der
Vyver, supra note 51, at 790; see also LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2001) (citing sources). Suffice it to recognize the drag on compliance that occurs
when signaling behaviors are perceived as ideological rather than universal.
145 See AN-NA'IM, supra note 58, at 431. For thoughts on how universalization might be achieved,
see id. at 431-33.
